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ABSTRACT
The American Dream Demonstration is an evaluation of whether Individual
Development Accounts are likely to achieve their intended purposes cost-effectively.
Financial benefit-cost analysis is a key input into this overall evaluation. The
framework here describes how to estimate the present value of changes in resource
flows caused by IDAs for seven groups of stakeholders: IDA participants, non-
participants, the federal government, state and local government, employees of IDA
programs, private donors, and society as a whole. The goal of the framework is to make
sure that the financial BCA considers the most important issues and that the analysts
know the logic of the BCA well enough to catch and to fix flaws in the plan once they
are in the field. Although the framework emphasizes the types of benefits and costs
expected to matter most for IDAs, it could also be applied to other public
interventions.
1 Each of the seven groups has some veto power over the success of the whole
project. For example, if participants believe that their benefits from participation are
less than their costs, then IDAs will fail, even if—given that someone would
participate—benefits would exceed costs for the other six groups. Schreiner (1997)
discusses the rationale for project evaluation from multiple points of view.
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A Framework for Financial Benefit-cost Analysis
of Individual Development Accounts
at the Experimental Site
of the American Dream Demonstration
1. Introduction
How do Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) affect resource flows? The
financial benefit-cost analysis at the experimental site of the American Dream
Demonstration (ADD) uses a standard present-value, cash-flow framework to answer
this question from the points of view of seven groups of stakeholders: IDA participants,
non-participants, the federal government, state and local government, employees of
IDA programs, private donors, and society as a whole. Each group has its own roles
and its own goals, and so each group experiences its own benefits and costs. If IDAs
are to help low-resource people to improve their lives and if IDAs are to improve social
welfare, then each group of stakeholders must play its part. In turn, this requires that
each group perceive that its own benefits exceed its own costs.1
Financial benefits and costs are not the only benefits and costs, and thus
financial benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is just one of many inputs into the overall
2evaluation of whether IDAs in ADD achieve their goals cost-effectively. Although
financial BCA omits many non-financial costs and benefits, it is still useful because
cash flows are one of the few things that can be estimated quantitatively and because
cash flows are a large share of total benefits and costs. Furthermore, government
policymakers often judge programs strictly by their fiscal effects.
This framework estimates, for all seven groups, not only whether financial
benefits exceed costs (sign of impact) but also by how much (size of impact). Also, the
process of doing the financial BCA should shed light on the causes of the sign and size
of impact; perhaps the most important output of ADD—perhaps even more important
than the judgement of cost-effectiveness—is improved knowledge of how to increase
total benefits and decrease total costs through such things as improved policy, better
contract design, more appropriate technology of supply, more relevant financial
education, stronger organization, and more efficient provision of IDA-related services.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 places the financial BCA in the context
of the overall evaluation. Section 3 describes the basic analytic tools used to compute
the present value of changes in resource flows caused by IDAs. Section 4 is the analysis
plan for each of the seven groups of stakeholders.
2 Quantitative estimates are often viewed as objective, while qualitative
estimates are often viewed as subjective. The connotation is that objectivity and
quantitativeness are to be preferred. The point of this section is that even seemingly
objective and quantitative estimates are ultimately subjective and qualitative.
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2. Rigorous Financial BCA in Context
This section makes two points. First, financial BCA is just one small and simple
part of the overall evaluation. The overall evaluation inevitably rests both on relatively
quantitative estimates from the financial BCA and from the experimental design and
on relatively qualitative judgements from other sources and other methods.2 Second, the
goal of rigor constrains the possibility of subjective excesses because it demands
transparency in the assumptions, experiences, evidence, and logic that support the
inevitably subjective judgements. Rigor is meant to make subjective judgements more
susceptible to critique and thus more likely to be improved through time.
2.1 Context
Figure 1 shows where financial BCA fits within the overall evaluation. The
overall evaluation itself is fundamentally a cost-effectiveness analysis. Because public
funds are scarce and because IDAs are just one of many tools that might be used to
help the poor and to improve social welfare, IDAs must be judged on whether they give
more bang for the buck than alternative programs. If IDAs are to be worthwhile from
the point of view of society as a whole, then it is not enough that they produce benefits,
nor is it enough that they produce more benefits than costs; IDAs must produce a
3 Appendix 1 discusses average financial cost analysis, a way to compare
quantitative outcomes in non-dollar units to financial costs. The overall evaluation of
ADD uses multiple methods—including in-depth interviews with participants, an
organizational process analysis, and the analysis of program administrative data—to
triangulate qualitative effects (Sherraden et al., 1995).
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greater surplus of benefits over costs than would the best program left unfunded in the
current government budget.
The overall cost-effectiveness evaluation uses both qualitative and quantitative
data. Financial benefits and costs are quantitative, but other benefits and costs may be
either quantitative or qualitative. The quality of “qualitative” or “quantitative” inheres
not in the benefit or cost itself but rather in its measurement. Qualitative benefits and
costs are either unmeasured, unmeasurable, or measured in units without high inter-
personal reliability; quantitative benefits and costs are measured in units with high
inter-personal reliability. Quantitative analyses are easier to subject to cross-checks,
and so, compared with qualitative analyses, they depend less on the unique experience
and judgement of the specific person who does the measurement.
Quantitative estimates may have dollar units (such as changes in income) or
non-dollar units (such as changes in the probability of voting). This BCA framework is
“financial” because it counts only benefits and costs measured in terms of dollars. Thus,
the analysis is incomplete; it misses all benefits and costs (qualitative or quantitative)
not measured in units of dollars.3
4 Furthermore, the financial BCA looks only at outcomes, not the process that
leads to outcomes. Financial outcomes are only a small part of the whole story, but its
quantitative veneer may attract disproportionate emphasis.
5 Examples are Schreiner (1999a and 1999b), Benus et al. (1995), and Drury,
Walsh, and Strong (1994). The best example is the first financial BCA of IDAs (Clones
et al., 1995). Although Clones et al. use almost no empirical estimates because data on
IDAs were sparse at that time, the pro forma analysis is nonetheless uncommonly
rigorous. Clones et al. carefully enumerate different sources of financial benefits and
costs for different groups of stakeholders and then discuss which benefits and costs they
might measure, which they cannot measure, and the basis for the assumptions used to
proxy for missing measurements.
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Because financial BCA considers only a small subset of all benefits and costs, it
cannot do all the work of the overall cost-effectiveness analysis.4 For example, IDAs
could lead to net financial losses but still be cost-effective overall if non-financial
benefits (quantitative and qualitative) exceed non-financial costs enough to compensate.
The simple and objective financial BCA cannot substitute for the difficult and
subjective overall cost-effectiveness analysis.
2.2 Rigor
In practice, however, financial BCA is sometimes asked to do all the work of the
overall cost-effectiveness analysis. For example, analysts may choose to ignore all non-
financial costs and benefits and to base their judgements of overall cost-effectiveness
only on financial BCA. There is nothing wrong with this, as long as the analysis
explicitly acknowledges the assumption of zero non-financial benefits and costs.5
6 Schreiner (1999c) gives examples from the evaluation of microenterprise
programs in the United States.
7 McCloskey (1998).
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Difficulties arise when judgements follow from implicit assumptions, unstated
evidence, unexamined experience, and fuzzy logic.6 The essence of subjectivity is non-
transparency; objectivity requires statements in units with inter-personal reliability, but
opaque or implicit factors lack explicit units and so must lack inter-personal reliability.
This is dangerous because it might allow mistaken judgements to pass unchecked.
Rigor is the attempt to improve inter-personal reliability. Arguments built on
exposed foundations are susceptible to improvement through discussion and criticism.7
The heart of the social-scientific method is not experiments but explicitness.
The first step toward units with inter-personal reliability is to express all
estimates explicitly. For example, debates whether qualitative non-financial net benefits
compensate for estimated net financial costs are more productive if the high and low
bounds assumed for net benefits are stated explicitly.
The second step is to measure as much as possible and then to point out those
measurements with less inter-personal reliability. Of course, no analysis can pretend to
quantify all benefits and costs. Such exhaustive measurement would be a hopeless task,
and more measurement has decreasing returns. Knowledge in the real world is always
incomplete and imperfect. Furthermore, many benefits and costs are psychological and
unquantifiable even to those who experience them.
8 Sherraden (1991, p. 6) says that “while incomes feed people’s stomachs, assets
change their heads.”
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Some subjectivity is inevitable. The goal is not to wipe out all subjective
estimates but rather to root out those that can be nudged toward objectivity and to
highlight the subjective contours of those that remain. Often, simply making explicit
the factors that influence a judgement provokes ideas for improvement or spotlights
gaps in logic. A rigorous analysis examines the factors behind a judgement, improves
them when it can, and makes them explicit so as to be subjected to further discussion.
The framework here measures as much as it can, and it is particularly simple
and inexpensive to measure cash flows. Many effects of IDAs, however, are complex
and expensive to measure because they are subtle, diffuse, and psychological. For
example, perhaps the most important hypothesis in asset-based welfare theory is that
IDAs spark hope.8 That is, people with IDAs expect to have greater resources in the
future, and this expectation changes their choices and efforts now. Hope is real;
unfortunately, it is difficult to squeeze down to a single number. Whether IDAs are
cost-effective, however, may hinge on judgements of the worth of their effects on hope.
The inevitable subjectivity of these judgements, however, does not remove the need to
explain carefully and explicitly how the judgements were made and to point out where
people might reasonably differ.
8The danger comes from subjective factors left in the dark or, worse, subjective
judgements presented as if they were objective. These common faults of rigor fall into
four basic patterns. First, because arithmetic is incontrovertible, analysts tend to
present mathematical results as if they were objective, and readers also tend to take
them in this way. But even seemingly objective numbers have large subjective elements.
For example, the analyst chooses whether or not to consider the time value of money.
Furthermore, the analyst judges what types of benefits and costs are worth the effort of
measurement. For example, one analyst may believe that a certain type of cost can be
safely assumed to be zero, while a second analyst will go to great lengths to measure it.
The exactness of numbers crunched through formulae seem to imply a correctness that
belies the probable inexactness and incorrectness of the numbers and of the formulae
itself. A financial BCA with flawless arithmetic that omits important types of benefits
and costs is not less flawed than an analysis with perfect data riddled with arithmetic
mistakes.
Second, some measurements are inexact. For example, no one knows the correct
discount rate for resource flows at different points in time. Furthermore, the market
value of assets is a guess unless the asset has just been sold. Likewise, reported income
depends on the personal rapport between the respondent and the interviewer, on the
honesty of the respondent, and on fallible human knowledge and memory.
9Third, the ability to quantify an effect says little about its importance or size.
For example, the effect of IDAs on public outlays for unemployment insurance is
relatively simple to measure. The size of the effect, however, may be much smaller than
that of increased hope, but hope is difficult to measure. The feasibility of measurement
should not lead the evaluation to focus on effects on the cash flows linked to
unemployment insurance and to ignore the effects on hope.
Fourth, readers often take the absence of caveats to mean that the analysis
needs no caveats. In fact, the absence of extensive caveats might mean that the analyst
did not recognize (or did not want to make explicit) the subjectivity beneath the
surface. Ironically, the lack of rigor as signaled by a lack of caveats may be mistaken
for a signal of strength.
The point is that even if the overall cost-effectiveness evaluation could ignore
qualitative factors (which it cannot), it would still inevitably have important subjective
elements. Cash flows are not the only thing that matters, even if they are
straightforward to estimate. In the end, the analysis must weigh all the factors—both
quantitative and qualitative—and pronounce a judgement. The judgement will be
inevitably subjective, but this subjectivity is not bad. Good subjective judgements,
however, are not matters of mere opinion. Rather, they are supported by experience
and estimates, both qualitative and quantitative, and buttressed by logic and
10
arguments based on explicit assumptions. Good subjective judgements are susceptible
to reasoned debate.
Rigor aims to make the subjective factors behind a judgement of cost-
effectiveness as transparent to others as they are to the analysts. This is useful for two
reasons. First, the attempt at rigor forces analysts to check their own logic. Second, if
others disagree with the analysts, then the explicit basis of the judgement promotes
reasoned talk that could lead to improvement. Rigor whittles away unneeded
subjectivity and highlights unresolved subjectivity.
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3. Present Value of Resource Flows
The heart of the financial BCA is the estimation of the present value of resource
flows due to IDAs as seen by the seven groups of stakeholders. Given a point of view,
the framework counts resource outflows as costs and resource inflows as benefits. All
flows are discounted by when they take place in time. Benefits net of costs for society
as a whole is the sum of benefits net of costs for the other six groups of stakeholders.
The effect of IDAs is the sum of benefits net of costs with IDAs minus the sum of
benefits net of costs without IDAs.
This section describes the basic analytic tools for the present-value framework. It
discusses the question addressed, the time frame, the discount rate, the social weights
of benefits and costs, the interpolation of cash flows between surveys, the measurement
of changes in cash flows at the experimental site, and the appropriateness of a cash-
flow framework. It also compares the present-value approach with the return-on-
human-investment approach.
3.1 The question asked
The financial BCA of ADD asks one simple, important question: “How do IDAs
affect the present value of resource flows for different groups of stakeholders?” It does
not address other questions of policy import such as how the effects of IDAs in ADD
compare to the effects of IDAs in other programs, nor how IDAs affect eligible
individuals. This means that members of the control group who get access to IDAs
9 Sherraden (1990).
10 The last year of data collection is denoted T.
11 Note that in October 1999, a newly assigned participant would be at t = 0,
but a participant assigned in October 1998 would be at t = 1.
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through another program will be thrown out of the sample. It also means that members
of the treatment group who drop out of ADD will stay in the sample.
3.2 Time frame
Assets are resources that last through time. The effects of assets, like assets
themselves, also can be expected to build through time.9 Thus, ADD tracks outcomes
for participants and controls for 42 months (3.5 years) after assignment.10 The baseline
survey is just before random assignment (t = 0), the first follow-up survey is 18 months
(t = 1.5 years) after assignment, and the second follow-up survey is 42 months (t = 3.5
years) after assignment. The first participants enrolled in October 1998.11
Of course, the effects of IDAs may last beyond 3.5 years, and judgements of
overall cost-effectiveness may hinge on these effects. Budget constraints prevent a
longer period of data collection, but the analysis will report results under three sets of
simple assumptions about extrapolation beyond year T. The type of extrapolation
assumed may determine both the sign and the size of net benefits in the financial BCA.
The BCA plan for ADD considers three types of extrapolation: no extrapolation,
extrapolation of levels, and extrapolation of changes. The examples below use Figure 2
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and a set of changes in net cash flows: !$1 in the six months before t = 0.5, !$3 in the
year 1.5, !$4 in year 2.5, and !2 in year 3.5, the last year, T = 3.5.
3.2.1 No extrapolation
One possible assumption is that the effects of access to IDAs end after 3.5 years.
This simple and unrealistic assumption is common in practice because all other
extrapolation assumptions are just as arbitrary but more complex. In Figure 2, no
extrapolation is shown by the dotted line at zero for all years after T = 3.5.
3.2.2 Extrapolation of levels
Under extrapolation of levels, the undiscounted impact on net cash flows in the
final year of data collection is assumed to persist in each future year. That is, if (T is
the change in the net cash flow in year T caused by access to IDAs, then (T+i = (T, i 0
{1, 2, . . . 4}. In the example (Figure 2), the change in net flows in year 4.5 (and in
subsequent years) is assumed to be !2, the same as the change in net flows in year 3.5.
3.2.3 Extrapolation of changes
Under extrapolation of changes, the change in the undiscounted change in the
net cash flow in year T is assumed to be the change for each year in the future, or (T+i
= (T+i!1 + ((T+i!1  ! (T+i!2). In the example (Figure 2), the change in net cash flows is
!4 in year 2.5 and !2 in year 3.5, so the assumed change in the change in net cash
flows for year 4.5 is !2 + [(!2) ! (!4)] = 0. Likewise, the change in net flows assumed
for year 5.5 is 0 + [0 ! (!2)] = 2.
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3.3 Discounting
The financial BCA discounts resource flows because different flows take place at
different times. If IDAs change life courses and/or spark hope, then they will alter flows
not only during participation but also afterwards, perhaps through decades or
generations. Discounting recognizes that a benefit or cost today is worth more, from the
point of view of today, than the same benefit or cost tomorrow.
The timing of resource flows matters for at least four reasons. First, even in the
absence of inflation, a dollar invested today usually yields more than a dollar
tomorrow. Second, although people who want to transfer resources from the present to
the future can always save, people who want to transfer resources from the future to
the present cannot always borrow because of imperfect credit markets or because of
their own lack of creditworthiness. Thus, an extra dollar is worth more sooner than
later to people who cannot borrow as much as they want. Third, people do not know
what the future holds. They may often prefer earlier cash flows because they might die
or because their fortune might unexpectedly improve. Fourth, imperfect human
imagination may sometimes weigh current wants more than future wants. For
psychological reasons, some people do not always care about the well-being of their
future selves as much as their future selves would like.
12 Boulding, 1962.
13 The default assumption is 10 percent both for the United State government
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1972) and for the World Bank (Belli, 1996).
Quirk and Teresawa (1991) suggest that this figure is likely to be too low because most
governments have unfunded projects with social rates of return in excess of 10 percent.
14 In practice, the question of the “correct” discount rate is often moot. Suppose,
for example, that financial BCA is used to select among alternative projects funded
from a fixed budget. If the same discount rate is used to evaluate all alternatives, then
the choice of projects is invariant to the exact rate assumed (Belli, 1996).
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All of this strongly suggests that a dollar in the hand today is not worth half of
two dollars in the bush tomorrow. In fact, a dollar today plus a dollar tomorrow is not
two dollars at any time.12 Resource flows at different times have different units.
To compare, add, or subtract resource flows at different times meaningfully
requires expression in a common unit. Discounting does this. It weighs flows less and
less as they take place more and more in the future. All discounted resource flows have
units of dollars as of the start of the time frame.
The financial BCA for ADD assumes that the discount rate r for all years is 10
percent per year in real terms. Of course, no one knows the correct discount rate, but
the two biggest users of financial BCA both use 10 percent as a standard benchmark.13
The analysis checks the sensitivity of the results to the assumed discount rate.14
Given a discount rate r, the annual discount factor * is = 1 / (1 + r). If a cash
flow takes place at time t, then the present value as of the start of the time frame is the
15 The t of “*t” is a mathematical exponent, not a notational superscript.
16 In general, 0 # *t # 1, so given a resource flow ft, the discounted flow is never
larger than the undiscounted flow (*t@ft # ft). Furthermore, discounted flows are smaller
as flows take place further in the future (for , > 0, *t+,@ft < *t@ft).
17 Schreiner (1997). If the flow accumulates over six months instead of a year,
then the discount factor is about *t!0.25. For example, the discount factor for a flow that
accumulates between random assignment and the end of the sixth month (t = 0.5) is
*0.5!0.25 Ñ 0.90910.25 Ñ 0.9765.
18 Schreiner (1999b).
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cash flow multiplied by *t.15 Given r = 0.10, * = 1 / (1 + 0.1) Ñ 0.9091. Stakeholders
are assumed to be indifferent between one dollar one year after the start of the time
frame or about 91 cents at the start of the time frame.16
In practice, the analysis measures annual accumulated resource flows and does
not have knowledge of exactly when flows take place during a year. A reasonable
assumption is that the annual flow accumulated from a constant, even flow throughout
the year. The discount factor to apply to the accumulated annual flow is about *t!0.5.17
Discounting makes sense only if dollars are in units with constant purchasing
power. Inflation changes the price level of goods and services, so all flows to be
discounted must first be converted to constant-dollar units. In this evaluation, the
standard for constant dollars is as of year T, the end of the time frame. Given a
nominal dollar amount dt at time t, the consumer price index CPIt at time t, and the
consumer price index CPIT at time T, then the constant-dollar value ft of dt in units of
dollars as of time T is dt@(CPIT / CPIt).18
19 Deaton (1997) is an excellent discussion.
20 Clones et al. (1995).
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3.4 Social weights
To a given individual, the experience of a dollar of benefit or of a dollar of cost
is worth a dollar. To society as a whole, however, a dollar of benefit or cost may be
worth more or less than a dollar, depending on which specific individual experiences it.
For example, if society has a preference for the poor or disadvantaged, then a given
benefit or cost for a poor, disadvantaged person is weighed more than that same benefit
or cost for a rich, advantaged person. The analytical tool that describes social
preferences for benefits and costs across different people is the social-welfare function.19
Unfortunately, the social-welfare function is unknown. To follow standard
practice, the financial BCA assumes that a dollar has the same social worth regardless
of who gets it. The overall cost-effectiveness evaluation, however, may choose to weigh
the poor more than the rich. This is as it should be, as long as the weights are explicit.
3.5 Present value versus return on human investment
The financial BCA of ADD uses a present-value framework, whereas the only
other financial BCA of IDAs uses a return-on-human-investment framework.20 What
are the differences between the two frameworks, and why use present value?
21 Brizius (1991), as cited in Clones et al. (1995).
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Return-on-human-investment analysis (ROHI) computes an annual rate of
return on changes in resource flows caused by IDAs. If net cash inflows in year t are
benefits bt and if cash outflows are costs ct, then the annual rate of return is:21
ROHI ' 1
Years
@
Inflows ! Outflows
Outflows
'
1
T
@
j
T
t'1
bt ! j
T
t'1
ct
j
T
t'1
ct
. (1)
In contrast, present-value analysis (PV) computes the dollar worth of the
changes in cash flows caused by IDAs as seen from the start of the time frame:
PV ' Discounted inflows ! Discounted outflows ' j
T
t'1
*t @bt ! j
T
t'1
*t @ct (2)
PV differs from ROHI in three important ways. First, ROHI does not discount,
but PV does. This means that ROHI overstates the apparent return for projects (such
as IDAs) in which most costs are bunched toward the start of the time frame and in
which most benefits are bunched toward the end of the time frame. A dollar of cost at t
= 1 is not offset by a dollar of benefit at t = 3, but ROHI assumes that it does.
Discounting matters less in short time frames, but IDAs have effects through long time
frames.
Second, ROHI produces a rate of return, but PV produces a number of
discounted dollars. Unlike dollar amounts, rates of return are invariant to project size.
22 For example, if there is one outflow of $100 at t = 0 and one inflow of $200 at
t = 10, then the flat rate of return in ROHI is 10 percent per year (Equation 1). In
contrast, the compound rate in PV is about 7 percent per year (the solution of
Equation 3, the discount rate r that solves 0 = !(1 + r)!0 + (1 + r)!10@200 is 0.0714).
Given their definitions, both rates are meaningful, but the flat rate is bigger and
ignores the timing of cash flows.
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If the analyst prefers to work with rates of return, however, then the best rate is not
the one defined by the ROHI formula but rather the internal rate of return, defined as
the discount rate r that makes the present value of cash flows exactly zero:
PV ' 0 ' j
T
t'1
(1% r)!t @bt ! j
T
t'1
(1%r )!t @ct (3)
Furthermore, PV produces a compound rate, whereas ROHI produces a flat
rate. In the real world, rates compound. Also, the absolute value of the flat rate is
bigger than the absolute value of the compound rate, so ROHI again inflates the
apparent rate of return.22
Third, the name of ROHI contains the words human and investment. In practice,
however, what matters are the level and timing of resource flows, not whether outflows
are labeled as costs or as investments. Likewise, what matters from the financial point
of view taken in both PV and ROHI is not whether outflows are invested in humans or
elsewhere but rather whether the outflows bear fruit in terms of inflows.
In all three dimensions, PV is technically better than ROHI For non-technical
reasons, however, ROHI is more likely to make a given project look good. Because the
23 If IDAs had only direct effects, then they would be nothing more than cash
transfers.
20
goal of the evaluation of IDAs is not more IDAs but rather more well-being, this
framework uses PV.
3.6 Measurement of changes in cash flows
The financial BCA measures benefits and costs as the changes in cash flows
caused by IDAs. The difficult task is to distinguish between changes caused by IDAs
and changes caused by other forces.
For all groups of stakeholders except participants, benefits (costs) are assumed
to be all cash inflows (outflows) to (from) an IDA program or to (from) an IDA
participant. This makes sense because, in the absence of IDAs, none of these flows
would have taken place. That is, IDAs are assumed to cause all cash flows directly
related to IDAs and not to affect any cash flows not directly related to IDAs.
Cash flows for participants are more complex. Of course, the presence of IDAs
changes IDA-related cash flows for participants, but IDAs may also change cash flows
only indirectly related to IDAs.23 For example, an IDA may help someone to complete a
degree, to earn higher wages, and/or to require less public assistance. Thus, the
indirect effects of the IDA on cash flows might be to increase income from employment
and/or to decrease income from public assistance. Likewise, IDAs may instill a savings
24 Moffitt (1991).
25 This maintains the common assumption that the impact of treatment is
constant across individuals.
26 All else constant, an experimental design serves best the purposes of the
financial BCA. No other design is as simple to explain to the public or to policymakers,
and no other design controls as well for factors beyond the control of the analyst
(Manski, 1995). Experimental designs are not bulletproof, but non-experimental designs
have all the weaknesses of experimental designs, plus other weaknesses. In ADD, the
experimental site is the Community Action Program of Tulsa County in Oklahoma.
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habit that indirectly leads to greater investment and less consumption in the short
term but greater cash inflows and more consumption in the long term.
Because participants have IDAs, the analysis cannot observe what their non-
IDA-related cash flows would have been without IDAs.24 Instead, the non-IDA-related
flows of a control group proxy for the flows of participants, had they not participated.
In ADD, random assignment of applicants to the treatment or control groups is
intended to ensure that the joint distribution of all observed and unobserved
characteristics (other than access to IDAs) that might affect cash flows are the same
for the two groups. If random assignment succeeds, then all differences in outcomes
between the two groups can be attributed to access to IDAs.25, 26 If, however,
randomization does not purge all differences in characteristics between the two groups,
then differences in outcomes might be due to these differences rather than to the
differences in access to IDAs.
27 The next section describes pure net appreciation in detail.
28 For example, random assignment will, on average if repeated many times,
produce treatment and control groups with the same average age. In any given instance
22
Members in the treatment or control groups are indexed by i and j, where i , {1,
. . ., Nj}, where j 0 {x, c}, and where x is treatment and c is control. The surveys
collect data for the previous twelve months just before random assignment (t = 0), 18
months after random assignment (t = 1.5), and 42 months after random assignment (t
= 3.5). The net cash flow for member i of group j in year t is yjit, defined as cash
inflows bjit, minus cash outflows cjit, plus pure net appreciation "jit.27 If random
assignment does purge all differences between the two groups in the distributions of
characteristics that might affect outcomes, then an estimate of the average change in
net cash flows in year t caused by IDAs (t is the average net cash flow for treatments
minus the average net cash flow for controls:
(t '
1
Nx
@j
Nx
i'1
yxit !
1
Nx
@j
Nc
i'1
ycit . (4)
In ADD, 537 treatments and 566 controls completed the baseline survey. With
survey non-response, about 400 from each group will probably complete both of the
follow-up surveys. By the standards of a social-science experiment, 400 cases is a large
sample. Still, sampling variation may cause differences in the joint distribution of
observed and unobserved characteristics between treatments and controls in spite of
randomization.28 In this case, measurement of the impact of IDAs requires techniques
of random assignment, however, the luck of the draw may make one group younger
than the other. If age affects cash flows, then the differences in the distribution of age
between the groups could cause differences in cash flows that should not be attributed
to differences in access to IDAs but rather to differences in age.
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to control for differences between the two groups in terms of observed characteristics,
unobserved characteristics, or both observed and unobserved characteristics.
3.6.1 Observed characteristics are not randomized out
Even if randomization does equate the joint distribution of unobserved
characteristics between treatments and controls, it may not—in a finite sample—equate
the joint distribution of observed characteristics. For example, the luck of the draw
may lead to the average treatment having more education (and a greater likelihood of
higher cash inflows from employment) than the average control, regardless of access to
IDAs.
Simple regression analysis can control for observed differences. Define yjit = bjit !
cjit + "jit as the net resource flow in the previous year. The dependent variable yjit is
assumed to be a linear function of a (k x 1) vector of observed characteristics Xijt,
dummies dji1.5t and dji3.5t that mark access to IDAs, and an error term ejit. The dummy
dji1.5t is unity for treatments after the first follow-up survey (t = 1.5) and zero otherwise,
and dji3.5t is defined likewise. Observed characteristics in X should include the standard
29 Applicants are randomized into treatments and controls on a rolling basis, so
different treatments start at different times. Coefficients on the dummies for the year
and month of assignment will pick up idiosyncratic effects due to shifts in the local
macroeconomy as well as the effects of growth and learning by the IDA program.
30 A p-value of 0.50 makes sense here because the test is whether the effects of
observed characteristics on net resource flows differs between treatments and controls
in this particular social experiment. The test is not whether observed characteristics
would differ between groups in repeated sampling. Indeed, random assignment ensures
that, in average and in repeated samples, they would not.
31 The concept of condensing the effects of the distribution of observed
characteristics to a scalar propensity score has roots in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997) and in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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list of demographic, educational, and financial traits as well as dummies for the year
and month of assignment.29
Let $ be a (1 x k) vector of average effects on net cash flows of unit changes in
observed characteristics in X. Likewise, let (1.5 and (3.5 be the scalar estimates of the
average effects on net cash flows of participation in a given year as marked by dji1.5t and
dji3.5t. The $ and ( coefficients may be derived from a multivariate estimator based on:
yjit ' $ @Xjit % (1.5 @dji1.5t % (3.5 @dji3.5t % ejit . (5)
Equation 5 is indicated instead of Equation 4 only if random assignment fails to
equate the joint distributions of observed characteristics across the two groups. A
simple test for whether this is the case compares the mean of $*@Xxi0 with the mean of
$*@Xci0. If the p-value of a statistical test of the equality between treatments and
controls of the mean effect of the observed characteristics on the outcome of interest is
less than 0.50, then the analysis should control for observed characteristics.30, 31
32 Successful randomization implies that the distribution (and thus the average)
of 8 for treatments is the same as the distribution (and thus the average) of 8 for
controls.
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3.6.2 Unobserved characteristics are not randomized out
Randomization may equate observed characteristics across treatments and
controls but yet fail to equate unobserved characteristics. For example, the average
treatment may, by chance, have more innate desire to save (“oomph”) and to improve
long-term well-being than the average control. Failure to account for this would
incorrectly attribute differences in effects on net resource flows across treatments and
controls to differences in access to IDAs instead of to differences in oomph.
The analysis makes the standard assumption that unobserved oomph 8ji does
not vary from year to year (and thus has no time subscript) and that unobserved
oomph 8ji affects net resource flows linearly. Thus, total net flows are the sum of flows
in the absence of any special oomph yjit plus the effects of oomph 8ji. Equation 4 omits
the 8ji because it assumed that all differences in the distribution of oomph between the
two groups were successfully randomized out.32 If not, then Equation 4 becomes:
(t '
1
Nx
@j
Nx
i'1
(yxit % 8xi) !
1
Nx
@j
Nc
i'1
(ycit % 8ci ). (6)
Because the distribution of oomph 8xi and 8ci might differ between treatments
and controls and because oomph is unobserved, it is swept out by lagging each side of
33 Lagged values are denoted with a delta (“)”). For example, )fjit = fjit ! fjit!1.
ADD does not measure lagged net cash flows fjit!1; their interpolation is described
below.
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Equation 6 and then subtracting the result from the original equation.33 An estimate of
the average effect on net cash flows of access to IDAs is then )(t:
(t!(t!1'
1
Nx
@j
Nx
i'1
(yxit%8xi)!
1
Nx
@j
Nc
i'1
(ycit%8ci) !
1
Nx
@j
Nx
i'1
(yxit!1%8xi)!
1
Nx
@j
Nc
i'1
(ycit!1%8ci) ,
)(t '
1
Nx
@j
Nx
i'1
)yxit!
1
Nx
@j
Nc
i'1
)ycit .
(7)
It is impossible to test whether random assignment successfully equates the
distribution of unobserved oomph for treatments and controls. A conservative strategy
is to compute effects with both Equation 4 and Equation 7. If the estimates are close in
some metric, then use Equation 4 because it is simpler. If the estimates differ, use
Equation 7 because it drops the assumption that randomization worked.
3.6.3 Both observed and unobserved characteristics are not randomized out
The weakest assumption is that randomization fails for both observed and
unobserved characteristics. With finite samples, this is not unlikely. The technique to
estimate effects uses multivariate regression as in Equation 5 and lagged data as in
Equation 7. When unobservables 8ji are not randomized out, Equation 5 becomes:
yjit ' $ @Xjit % 8ij % (1.5 @dji1.5t % (3.5 @dji3.5t % ejit . (8)
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To sweep out unobservables, lag each side of Equation 8 and then subtract the
lagged value from the original equation:
yjit !yjit!1 ' ($ @Xjit % 8ij % (1.5 @dji1.5t % (3.5 @dji3.5t % ejit) !,
($ @Xjit!1 % 8ij % (1.5 @dji1.5t!1 % (3.5 @dji3.5t!1 % ejit!1) ,
)yjit ' $ @)Xjit % (1.5 @)dji1.5t % (3.5 @)dji3.5t % )ejit .
(9)
The average effects of access to IDAs on net cash flows are then the estimates of
(1.5 and (3.5 from a multivariate regression. Note that )dji1.5t is unity for treatments in
year 1.5 and zero otherwise and that )dji3.5t is unity for treatments in year 3.5 and zero
otherwise.
How does the analyst know if randomization failed for observables,
unobservables, or both? Given that all of the estimates in Equations 4, 5, 7, and 9 are
straightforward to compute, a conservative and robust strategy is to compute all four.
If the results are similar, then randomization probably worked and the simplest
estimates may be reported. If they differ, however, then the estimates that impose the
weakest assumptions about the effectiveness of randomization should be reported.
3.7 Interpolation
ADD surveys treatments and controls just before random assignment, 18 months
after assignment, and 42 months after assignment. Each survey asks about cash flows
in the previous 12 months, so ADD lacks data on cash flows in months 1-6 nor in
months 19-30. Thus, some flows must be interpolated.
34 Flows at t = 0.5 are unique in that they refer only to the previous six months.
35 Non-flow characteristics should not be halved to adjust for the six-month
period.
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Interpolation serves two purposes. First, the estimation of the effects of access to
IDAs on net cash flows in years 1.5 and 3.5 ((1.5 and (3.5) requires lagged values of yjit
and Xjit, but the surveys do not capture these lagged values. Second, the 42-month time
frame of the present-value analysis requires estimates of not only (1.5 and (3.5 but also
of (0.5 and (2.5.
A simple assumption is that the missing values are the average of known values
from the two surveys that bookend the missing months. Thus, the interpolated net flow
yji2.5 in the year before t = 2.5 is the average of flows in the first and second follow-up
surveys, or yji2.5 = 0.5@(yji1.5 + yji3.5). For example, suppose that the measured net cash
flow yij0 in the baseline year was $10, that yji1.5 fell to $5 as cash flowed from the
household into IDA accounts, and that yji3.5 was $15 as cash flowed into the household
from IDA accounts and matches. Then yji1.5 = 0.5@($5 + $15) = $10.
To interpolate the net flows yji0.5 in the 6 months previous to t = 0.5,34 the
analysis uses the average of half the net flows in the baseline survey and the first
follow-up survey, or yji0.5 = 0.50@[0.50@(yji0 + yji1.5)]. In the example, yji0.5 = 0.50@[0.50@($10
+ $5)] = $3.75.
Observed characteristics Xji0.5 and Xji2.5 are interpolated in the same way.35 Given
measurements and interpolations of net flows and of observed characteristics, the
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estimated effects of access to IDAs on net flows (1.5 and (3.5 are computed. Finally, (0.5
and (2.5 are interpolated as (0.5 = 0.5@[0.5@((0 + (1.5)] = 0.25@(1.5 (because (0 = 0) and as
(2.5 = 0.5@((1.5 + (3.5). Given that (0.5 covers only six months and assuming
extrapolation of levels beyond 3.5 years, the present value to participants of IDAs is:
PV ' *0.25 @(0.5 % j
3
t'1
*t @(t%0.5 % j
4
t'4
*t @(3.5 . (10)
If extrapolation of changes is assumed, then Equation 10 becomes:
PV ' *0.25 @(0.5 % j
3
t'1
*t @(t%0.5 % j
4
t'4
*t @ [(3.5% (t!3) @)(3.5 ] . (11)
As an example, suppose that all the changes the net cash flows in the previous
example were caused by access to IDAs. In other words, average net flows ycit for
controls are $10 in all periods, and average net flows for treatments are yxi0 = $10, yxi1.5
= $5, and yxi3.5 = $15. If randomization worked, then (1.5 = !$5 and (3.5 = $5.
Interpolating gives (0.5 = !$1.25 and (2.5 = $0.00. With extrapolation of levels:
PV ' *0.25 @(!$1.25)% * @ (!$5)% *2 @($0)% *3 @$5%7.51 @$5,
' !$2.02 % $37.55 ,
' $35.53 .
(12)
The estimate of present value depends strongly on the assumed extrapolation.
With the simplest assumption that all effects beyond t = 3.5 are zero, the present value
of IDAs in this example is negative (!$2.02). The assumption of extrapolation of levels,
however, produces a positive present value ($35.53). The assumption of extrapolation of
changes in Equation 11 increases the present value to $448.77.
36 This section expands on Schreiner (2000a).
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3.8 The appropriateness of a framework based on cash flows
In the evaluation literature, the appropriateness of discounted cash-flow analysis
is unquestioned. The framework rests on massive precedent, and its use in practice is
standard. Indeed, governments—and sometimes other stakeholders—often count their
own benefits and costs explicitly in terms of cash flows.
3.8.1 Cash flows versus resource flows
The ideal BCA, however, would look at resource flows rather than cash flows.36
A resource increases the ability of people to improve their well-being, that is, to do or
to be what they have reason to want. Cash is a resource, but, for example, so is human
capital (skills from education and experience that increases the ability to do valued
work) and social capital (relationships that facilitate valued work). Cash flows are but
a small subset of all resource flows.
Resources may produce goods and services sold on the market, but they may
also produce non-market goods and services shared within the household. Furthermore,
some resources have existence value because people like to savor the thought of their
37 For example, some people are happier if they know that the Alaskan shoreline
is pristine, even though this does not serve to provide them with more or better goods
or services.
38 Maital (1986) argues much of joy and pain result from mental rewards and
punishments that are self-imposed.
39 The discussion of existence value and psychic value at the level of the
individual in no way implies that the effects of these values, when combined among
individuals in a society, do not produce social values and effects that can be more or
less than the sum of the individual values and effects.
40 Scanlon (1999 and 1996); Page-Adams and Vosler (1997); Cheng and Page-
Adams (1996); Page-Adams and Sherraden (1996).
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very being.37 Likewise, some resources have psychic value because they affect the
structure of the internal gains and costs that people mentally impose on themselves.38, 39
In financial BCA, assets are nothing more than possible ways to move resources
through time. Of course, assets are much more than just frozen cash stored for future
consumption or kept as a buffer against risk. For example, assets are often means of
production. Plant and equipment are valuable not so much because they are efficient
ways to store resources nor because they act as insurance but rather because, when
combined with human time and effort, they produce more resources for consumption or
investment. Likewise, human capital is more than just a way to convert a childhood
invested in schoolwork into cash inflows from an adulthood spent in wage work.
Furthermore, people also get pleasure from the humanistic value of accumulated
wisdom and from the state of being educated. Likewise, a home provides shelter, and
home ownership also seems to change how people think and act.40 In sum, human
41 In other words, IDAs cannot help but benefit the poor, just like any resource
transfer that enable greater consumption or, if part of the transfer is saved, greater
productivity, greater ability to bear risk, or greater storage of consumption. The
relevant question is thus not whether IDAs have positive effects but whether they have
positive effects that go beyond those of any other type of resource transfer.
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behavior imbues resources with worth distinct from their usefulness in production and
consumption.
If resources in the form of IDAs do not have psychic worth apart from their
economic worth, then IDAs are little more than traditional cash-transfer programs in
sheep’s clothing. IDAs increase the size of transfers to the poor, and if IDAs are to be
more than just bigger, post-dated welfare checks, then they must also affect the hearts
and minds of participants in ways that go beyond the economic effects of increased
cash transfers.41
In his seminal work on assets and the poor, Sherraden (1991) argues that assets
are indeed much more than mere factors of production, stores of potential consumption,
and buffers for shocks. In his view, the ownership of assets may produce asset effects,
that is, non-economic psychological and social changes in expectations and internal-
reward systems that serve to improve well-being in the long term.
3.8.2. Amount of transfer versus form of transfer
What distinguishes IDAs from traditional cash assistance is not so much the
amount of the transfer but rather its form. Like public education, Medicaid, and food
stamps, IDAs attempt to transfer resources to the poor not as unrestricted cash but
42 For example, a whole home may be sold all at once, but not half a home.
Likewise, skill and experience (human capital) cannot be sold all at once but rather
only through time in the workforce.
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rather in non-cash forms thought to improve long-term well-being both for the recipient
and for society as a whole. The form of the transfer is what may spark asset effects;
this explains the requirement that users of IDAs save through time (and thus to savor
the savings and their expected use) and also the attempt to restrict the use of IDA
withdrawals to purchases of assets unlikely to be sold for cash. In essence, IDAs try to
transfer not cash but rather homes, educations, and small firms. They also try to spark
the hope felt by owners and by expectant owners.
Of course, all forms of resources are convertible to other forms, so it may not
always be clear why a dollar is transferred in the form of an IDA might spark more
asset effects than would a dollar transferred in the form of a traditional welfare check.
In principle, someone could convert an IDA into drink if they buy a house with an
IDA, sell the house, and drink the proceeds. Likewise, someone could save the resources
from a traditional welfare check.
In practice, however, most people do not usually act as if all forms of resources
are convertible to all other forms. First, conversion has frictional costs of time and
effort. Transaction costs are lowest for cash and highest for illiquid, lumpy assets.42 
Second, if a household would have saved on its own and then bought assets that
meet IDA rules even in the absence of IDAs, then the extra resources from the IDA do
43 Von Pischke and Adams (1980) discuss this concept of fungibility.
44 Beverly and Sherraden (1998), Beverly (1997), Thalor (1990), Shefrin and
Thalor (1988), Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
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not cause the intended asset purchase but rather just relaxes the budget constraint and
allows the household to spend more for other purposes.43 Most people, however, do tend
to link mentally the sources of resources with their uses.44 Furthermore, most targeted
participants would not, in the absence of IDAs, have bought a house, gone to college,
or strengthened a small firm because their budgets are too small for much more than
physical and cultural subsistence.
Third, the attempt to restrict the use of IDAs suggests to participants that
resources are not convertible, and the power of suggestion is strong. After all, most
people are honest and do not try to subvert the aims of programs meant to help them.
Furthermore, IDAs may allow participants, often for the first time in their lives, to
believe that college or home ownership is within their grasp. The financial education
linked to IDAs also teaches that IDA-approved assets are good purchases. This lesson
is not just paternalistic propaganda: the bulk of middle-class America rose through
education and home ownership, and most IDA participants recognize that the
45 Microenterprise is a possible exception. See Bhatt, Painter, and Tang (1999),
Schreiner (1999d and 1999e), Ehlers and Main (1998), Bates (1997), and Bendick and
Egan (1987). The first IDA proposals  (Sherraden, 1988 and 1990) did not discuss
microenterprise as an approved use.
46 The issue is less what to measure than how to measure, given budget
constraints.
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purchases allowed by IDA rules are also the best purchases in terms of their own self-
interest.45 Some participants may divert IDA resources to unintended uses, but most of
them will not.
3.8.3 Financial BCA in the presence of psychic asset effects
The dilemma—and the irony—is that the standard present-value framework
counts improvements in well-being only in terms of increases in net resource flows. In
its failure to count the psychic asset effects caused by the restricted form of IDA
transfers, the financial BCA of IDA programs resembles the typical evaluations of the
so-called manpower programs. These programs transfer skills to help workers to get
and to keep jobs, but the evaluations measure the return to the transferred asset of
human capital exclusively in terms of changes in employment and wages rather than
also in terms of changes in outlook and behavior.
The BCA framework for ADD defers the challenge of the measurement of the
worth of psychic and behavioral changes in units with high inter-personal reliability.46
It uses a cash-flow framework despite its weaknesses because it is the only way to
compare net benefits for participants and for other groups of stakeholders. Thus, it
47 The term psychic effects refers to changes in thoughts and behavior due to the
ownership of assets. The results of these psychic effects on the outcomes of interest,
however, could be either psychic themselves (for example, greater hope or happiness) or
economic (for example, higher income or better insurance).
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assumes zero worth for effects of IDAs that do not change cash flows. Because IDAs do
aim to help people to build assets and thus to change thoughts and behaviors, this
approach may miss much of what may be the most important effects of IDAs.
3.8.4 A framework for the measurement of psychic asset effects
What might be the rough contours of a conceptual framework that could guide
attempts to measure the indirect psychic effects of asset accumulation? The key
departure from financial BCA is the distinction between income as an inflow of
resources in a time frame and assets as a level of resources kept through time. The
measurement of assets must explicitly incorporate ownership through time.
Furthermore, an asset-based framework must carefully distinguish between indirect
psychic effects due to changes in thoughts and behavior and direct economic effects due
to greater productivity, better storage of potential consumption, and greater ability to
bear risk.47
The task is then to link changes of assets with changes in thought and behavior
unrelated to the changes in economic opportunities that are also linked to the changes
in assets. The first step is to measure assets in units of resources held through time.
Define a dollar-year of assets as a $1 of resources kept for 12 months. For example, a
$2 shirt kept for 3 months is 0.5 dollar-years of assets. A simple estimate of the dollar-
48 The concept extends to non-financial assets. Human capital, for example,
could be measured in terms of year-years for human capital as proxied by age or in
terms of grade-years for human capital as proxied by education.
49 Skills and experience are also illiquid, but they still have strong direct effects
on current outcomes.
37
years of resources held in a year is the average of the stocks of assets at the start of the
year and at the end of the year, a¯t = (at + at!1) / 2.48
To distinguish the psychic effects of assets on expectations and behavior from
the economic effects of assets on productivity, consumption, and risk-bearing, a¯t should
include only assets that the household cannot choose to use in current production,
consumption, or insurance. Thus, a¯t might include balances in the match account of
IDAs, balances in tax-advantaged retirement accounts, and/or expected receipts of
bequests. These assets are too illiquid to affect current productivity, consumption, and
risk-bearing directly.49
Define zjit as an outcome in year t for member i of group j. This could be a net
cash flow, or it could be a non-financial outcome such as the number of hours spent in
volunteer work. Then, as in Equation 9, a regression to measure the indirect effects of
assets is:
)zjit ' $ @)Xjit % (1.5 @)aji1.5t % (3.5 @)aji3.5t % )ejit . (13)
Observed characteristics Xjit must include all factors correlated with a¯t that also
affect the outcome zjit. This includes income and consumption as well as all types of
50 Furthermore, a¯t decreases in some years—for example, when IDA matches are
withdrawn— so )a¯t will be negative. The decrease implies an increase in consumption
and/or in other assets. If these factors were excluded, then IDAs might appear to have
negative indirect effects even if their true indirect effects are positive.
51 Yadama and Sherraden (1996) attempt to use panel data to check whether
assets in 1968 precede (Granger-cause) attitudes in 1972. They measure assets,
however, as the value of housing and of financial savings. Thus, their finding that more
assets preceded better attitudes might reflect the direct economic effects of assets on
attitudes rather than any indirect psychic effects. Of the three ways that assets in 1968
might be correlated with attitudes in 1972, Yadama and Sherraden (1996) do not rule
out the two ways that are economic. First, it is possible that the ownership of assets in
1968 changed attitudes in 1972 for purely non-economic reasons. Second, because the
level of assets owned in 1972 is probably correlated with the level of assets owned in
1968, attitudes in 1972 might be due not to the non-economic effects of assets in 1968
but rather to the economic effects of assets in 1972. Third, attitudes likely persist
through time, so attitudes caused by the economic effects of assets in 1968 might
persist to at least some extent into 1972.
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assets excluded from a¯t because, all else constant, more resources increase the ability to
produce resources and thus the ability to realize a given positive outcome zjit.50
In practice, it is difficult to ensure that seeming asset effects are not spuriously
caused by factors omitted from Xjit but correlated with both zjit and a¯t.51 One fix is
random assignment. If the distribution of characteristics other than a¯t is the same for
both treatments and controls, then regression with Equation 13 without the $@)Xjit
term will estimate the psychic effects of assets.
52 The survey was revised slightly between the baseline and first follow-up, in
part to reflect the requirements of the this BCA plan. A copy of the baseline survey is
in Appendix D of Mills et al. (2000).
39
4. Plan of Analysis
This section describes the sources of data and the analysis plan. Benefits and
costs are measured from the points of view of the seven groups of stakeholders.
4.1 Sources of data
4.1.1 Survey of treatments and controls
Treatments and controls are asked identical sets of questions by telephone by
trained enumerators just before assignment, 18 months after assignment, and 42
months after assignment.52 The survey covers the previous 12 months and captures
demographic data as well as information about financial and non-financial outcomes. In
particular, it asks a battery of questions designed to detect changes in expectations,
attitudes, and behaviors.
4.1.2 MIS IDA monitoring instrument
Cash flows in IDA accounts are tracked by the Management Information System
for IDAs (MIS IDA). Staff of the IDA program copy bank statements to MIS IDA
monthly. They also use MIS IDA to collect demographic and financial data from
participants at enrollment. Furthermore, staff record resource flows in and out of the
program itself every six months.
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For cash flows in IDA accounts, MIS IDA is the authoritative source because the
data come straight from bank records. The survey serves only as a cross-check. For all
other data on treatments and controls, however, the survey is the authoritative source.
Also, MIS IDA covers only treatments, but the survey covers both treatments and
controls. Comparisons between the two groups require a single, consistent source of
data. Finally, the survey—but not MIS IDA—asks about expectations, attitudes, and
behaviors. These data are needed to test for the psychic effects of assets.
4.1.3 Desk review of tax laws
Changes in cash flows due to changes in tax liability are a large part of the
financial benefits and costs of IDAs for participants, for private donors, and for federal,
state, and local governments. Neither the survey nor MIS IDA collects tax data.
Instead, taxes are estimated from income and asset data from the survey and from a
desk review of federal, state, and local tax law. Estimates of how income and
investment affect tax liability are derived from relationships published in the literature.
4.1.4 Site visits to the IDA program
Program staff use MIS IDA to record self-reports of resource flows—both in-cash
and in-kind—between the IDA program, private donors, and government. It is possible,
however, that staff conceptions of what constitutes a resource flow (and of the worth of
in-kind flows) may not match perfectly with the conceptions required for the financial
BCA. Thus, a series of site visits will clarify definitions and cross-check (but not audit)
53 Furthermore, site visits reinforce to staff the importance of careful self-reports.
54 Schreiner (2000b) suggests activities and questions for the site visit.
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the data in MIS IDA.53 The analyst, due to greater knowledge of the purposes and
methods of the financial BCA, may, upon review of budgets, letters associated with
grants to the program, class syllabi, financial statements, and bank records, detect
resource flows that were inadvertently overlooked or double-counted in MIS IDA.54 In
particular, in-kind flows are often overlooked or undervalued, so the site visit will
attempt to price in-kind flows. For example, the analyst will ask landlords about the
market price of discounted office space, volunteers about their wage rates, and program
partners about the cost of free services.
Site visits last about one week. Visits are annual because most organizations
produce budgets and tax returns annually.
4.1.5 Interviews with government and private donors
Mail or phone interviews with government agencies and with private donors will
act as cross-checks on the reports of cash disbursements and technical assistance
recorded in MIS IDA. These interviews will also ask for estimates of administrative
costs related to the experimental site. If private donors are taxable, then a good
estimate of the worth of their gifts is the tax write-off claimed. As with the site visit,
the purpose is not to audit but rather to cross-check sources of data to ensure that all
resource flows are recorded and valued as required for the financial BCA.
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4.2 Data-analysis plan
4.2.1 Treatments and controls
4.2.1.1 Costs
The financial BCA of ADD measures costs for treatments and controls as net
resource outflows. “Costs” can be positive (increases in outflows) or negative (decreases
in outflows). Of course, negative costs are like benefits. MIS IDA provides records of
cash outflows from treatments to IDAs, and the survey provides records of all other
outflows from both treatments and controls. Table 1 summarizes the different types of
outflows.
4.2.1.1.1 IDA deposits
Deposits from participants to their IDA accounts are cash outflows and thus
count as costs when they take place. That deposits are counted as costs may come as a
surprise, but the present-value framework treats all cash outflows—whether for
consumption or for investment—as costs. Of course, cash inflows from IDA
withdrawals count as benefits when they take place.
Accrued interest on IDA deposits is, for participants, neither an inflow nor an
outflow and thus neither a benefit nor a cost. Accrued interest is like a withdrawal that
is deposited right back in the IDA account. The inflow and outflow cancel each other
out. Of course, accrued interest is counted as a benefit for participants when it is
withdrawn. MIS IDA collects data on deposits and accrued interest.
55 Clones et al. (1995) do this.
56 Boshara (2000). This tax treatment may change.
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4.2.1.1.2 Taxes paid
Taxes are outflows and thus count as costs for participants. If IDAs do help
participants to earn more income, accumulate more assets, and become more self-
sufficient, then participants will probably pay more taxes. If IDAs cause taxes to
decrease, then the effect will show up as a negative cost.
4.2.1.1.2.1 Federal taxes
At the federal level, treatments and controls pay tax on income from wage jobs
and from self-employment. They also pay FICA (social security) taxes.
The amount of income tax paid may be estimated from income data in the
survey and from I.R.S. rules. Income may also be linked to tax liability through
published relationships estimated from national surveys.55 Tax estimates also should
incorporate the effects of IDAs on income (and thus on receipt of the Earned Income
Tax Credit), on home-ownership (and thus on the use of the home-mortgage interest
deduction), and on the purchase of other tax-advantaged assets (such as Individual
Retirement Accounts).
Deposits and accrued interest in IDA accounts are not tax-deductible, and so
withdrawals for unapproved uses have no tax penalty. Withdrawals of IDA matches
(and interest accrued on matches) are counted as gifts and thus are not taxed.56
57 It is assumed that all income not spent on financial assets is spent on
something subject to sales tax.
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If a household owns all or part of a business, then profit taxes are computed as
net income before taxes, multiplied by the profit-tax rate, multiplied by the share of
ownership in the business. Data on business income and on ownership shares come
from the survey, and the tax rate comes from the I.R.S. code.
Both households and businesses pay FICA taxes. For wage jobs, FICA taxes are
computed as the personal FICA-tax rate multiplied by wage earnings from the survey.
For businesses, FICA taxes are computed as the business FICA-tax rate, multiplied by
the business’s payroll, multiplied by the share of ownership in the business.
4.2.1.1.2.2 State and local taxes
Households and businesses may also pay state and local taxes on income,
property, and purchases. State and local income taxes are computed based on state and
local tax law just like federal income taxes.
Sales taxes are computed as earnings from wage jobs and self-employment net of
changes in holdings of financial assets, multiplied by the sales-tax rate.57 The survey
records earnings and financial assets, and the site visit will record the sales-tax rate.
State and local property taxes are computed as local mill rates (gathered in the
site visits) multiplied by the value of land, homes, and other taxable assets (gathered in
the survey).
45
4.2.1.2 Benefits
The framework measures benefits for treatments and controls as net resource
inflows. “Benefits” can be positive (increases in inflows) or negative (decreases in
inflows). Negative benefits are like costs. Except for IDA withdrawals, all inflows for
treatments and controls come from the survey. Table 2 lists the types of inflows.
4.2.1.2.1 Withdrawals from IDAs
Whether used for an approved purchase or not, withdrawals by participants of
own deposits and accrued interest are inflows and thus are counted as benefits for the
participant. Any balances left at the end of the time frame are assumed to be
withdrawn.
Participants who make approved purchases receive inflows from IDA match
accounts. These are counted as benefits. MIS IDA records all withdrawals of own
deposits, interest, or matches.
4.2.1.2.2 Earnings
IDAs may affect earnings from wage jobs (through greater post-secondary
education), from self-employment (through greater resources earmarked for
microenterprise), and from other work not commonly thought of as a “business” (such
as infrequent yard work or babysitting). The survey captures all three types of
earnings.
58 Schreiner (1999e).
59 Sherraden et al. (2000) analyze how current and former welfare recipients can
save in IDAs.
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Earnings are cash inflows and thus are benefits. In the case of wage jobs,
however, IDAs may decrease earnings in two ways. First, IDAs decrease the cost of
post-secondary education; at least in the short term, this may draw people out of the
workforce and into school. Second, IDAs decrease the cost of microentrepreneurship
and thus may draw people out of wage jobs into self-employment where they may earn
less than would comparable workers in wage jobs.58
4.2.1.2.3 Public assistance
Receipts of public assistance are cash inflows that benefit treatments and
controls. Of course, if IDAs increase incomes and/or assets, then they may decrease
receipts of means-tested public assistance. The survey records inflows from public
assistance.
Access to IDAs may reduce the use of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), Supplemental Security Income, or General Assistance if it propels current
recipients into self-sufficiency or if it helps to keep current non-recipients from
becoming future recipients.59 In contrast, the prospect of eligibility for the resource
transfers embodied in IDAs may encourage some households to choose to decrease their
60 Moffitt (1986).
61 This technique was used by Clones et al. (1995).
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earnings (and use more public assistance) so as to get access to IDAs or to maintain
access to IDAs longer.60
IDAs likewise might increase or decrease the use of Medicaid. The survey asks
about coverage by Medicaid, but not for the cost or value of that coverage. The cost is
computed from published data on the average Medicaid expenses for people in a given
range of income.61
Like other in-kind transfers, food stamps free up cash that the household would
otherwise have spent on food. Thus, an inflow of food stamps is a benefit like any other
inflow of cash.
Access to IDAs may affect the receipt of unemployment insurance either through
its effects on self-employment (microenterprise) or through its effects on wage jobs
(post-secondary education).
If IDAs are used to buy homes, then they may decrease receipts of housing
assistance. The survey records the use of public housing or Section 8, the actual rent
paid, and the hypothetical rent that would be paid in the absence of public assistance.
The cash inflow is computed as the difference between hypothetical and actual rent.
Finally, IDAs may affect the receipt of other forms of means-tested public
assistance such as cash subsidies for utility bills.
62 For homes, businesses, stocks, and land and rental property, the survey asks
for market worth at the time of the survey, purchases and sales since the previous
survey, and cash expenditures for maintenance since the previous survey. Households
may own three other major forms of non-human-capital assets: financial assets with
fixed returns (such as cash, savings accounts, and bonds), consumer durables (such as
furniture, clothes, and appliances), and vehicles. These assets do not appreciate, and
they depreciate due to the consumption of their services. Thus, the worth of these
assets either does not change or changes for reasons other than pure net appreciation.
Thus, the financial BCA omits them. IDAs do affect the worth of human capital
through purchases and maintenance (for example, through post-secondary education
and through financial-literacy classes), but the effects of access to IDAs on the returns
to human capital are realized as changes in levels of income or of consumption through
time. Thus the survey already captures the effects of assets on human capital.
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4.2.1.2.4 Pure net appreciation of assets
Pure net appreciation is a change in the worth of an asset for reasons unrelated
to maintenance or consumption. Pure net appreciation is realized as a resource flow
when an asset is sold. Appreciation is central in this evaluation because IDAs try to
promote asset ownership.62 To understand its measurement requires a discussion of
resource conversions, whether from cash to non-cash forms or vice versa, from assets to
the consumption of asset services, or from cash to consumption.
4.2.1.2.4.1 Resource conversions
Purchases of assets, sales of assets, maintenance of assets, and consumption of
the services of assets are not flows of resources in and out of a household but rather
conversions of resources between different forms within a household. For example, total
resources are unchanged if a household buys a $100 house with $100 cash; resources in
the form of cash are converted to resources in the form of a house. Likewise, a
63 The BCA assumes that all cash spent on maintenance translates directly into
greater asset value.
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household that spends $30 on asset maintenance (for example, to convert $30 cash and
a $100 house with an old roof into a $130 house with a new roof63) does not transfer the
$30 cash to the outside world but rather converts it into a better roof. Resource
conversions are not resource flows, so they do not enter the financial BCA as benefits
or costs.
Pure net appreciation is a resource flow. An example of pure net appreciation is
when the worth of a house increases from $100 to $150 because a vacant lot next-door
is turned into a park. Likewise, pure net appreciation may arise from the use of non-
asset resources (such as time and effort) to fix up a house (apart from increases in
worth due to conversions of cash to construction materials).
Finally, consumption of the services of an asset—whether through cash spent on
goods or services or through depreciation due to the use of the services of a non-cash
asset—is not a resource outflow but rather a conversion. This conversion is not a loss
to net out of the financial BCA because resources consumed by a household stay within
the household. Furthermore, consumption, far from being a loss, is a goal; most
people—except misers—work and save so as to consume more, whether now or later.
Suppose, for the moment, that cash spent on consumption (or the depreciation of
non-cash assets due to the use of their services) were a resource outflow. Then, all else
constant, financial BCA would imply that a household that earns and spends
64 As discussed earlier, assets do have pure existence values. But the pleasure
from the contemplation of ownership or existence can be seen as a form of consumption
of asset services that does not reduce the worth of the asset in other uses.
65 For example, see Ramsey (1929); Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); Dercon
(1998); or Schreiner, Graham, and Miranda (1999).
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$1,000,000 in a year is just as well off as a household that earns and spends $1.
Likewise, it would imply that a household that drives a new luxury car into the ground
is as worse off than a household that drives an old clunker into the ground. But a
household is better off, all else constant, if it consumes $1,000,000 instead of $1 or if it
uses a new car instead of an old car. Consumption is much of well-being.64 If the
financial BCA intends to measure well-being, then it cannot count resources converted
to consumption as outflows.
The rhetoric of IDAs tends to discuss consumption as if it were opposed to asset
accumulation. In the short term, the dichotomy is real, because more assets now do
require less consumption now simply because current resources must be allocated
between assets and consumption. In the long term, however, the dichotomy dissolves;
more assets now usually means both more assets and more consumption in the future
because assets are not only stores of resources but also producers of additional
resources. The tight link between assets and consumption through time is one of the
most fundamental elements of most economic theories of growth and development.65
66 See Gittinger (1982).
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None of this contradicts in any way the goals of IDAs. From the point of view of
IDA programs, the goal is to help households to increase the amount of resources saved
through time, so asset accumulation is an end in itself. From the point of view of
households, however, the goal is greater consumption in the long term, and asset
accumulation is only a means to this end, not an end in itself.
4.2.1.2.4.2 Pure appreciation, net of resource conversions
Like standard BCA frameworks, this framework computes pure net appreciation
indirectly as a residual in an accounting identity that describes how the worth of assets
evolves through time.66 With the subscript for people and groups suppressed, assets at
the end of the year at are equal to assets at the start of the year at!1, plus pre net
appreciation "t, plus cash expenditures on asset maintenance mt, plus cash expenditures
on asset purchases pt, minus cash proceeds from asset sales st. Rearrangement gives
pure net appreciation in terms of data collected in the survey:
at ' at!1 % "t % mt % pt ! st ,
"t ' (at !at!1 ) % (st ! pt) ! mt .
(14)
Pure net appreciation is the change in asset levels (at ! at!1) not due to net sales
(st ! pt) nor to maintenance (mt). The survey records all the variables on the right-
hand side of Equation 14.
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The net resource flows yt available for consumption or investment are cash
inflows bt, minus cash outflows ct, (with cash spent on consumption excluded), plus
pure net appreciation "t:
yt ' bt ! ct % "t . (15)
Together, Equation 14 and Equation 15 give an expression for net resource flows
yt in terms of data collected in the survey:
yt ' bt ! ct % (at ! at!1) % (st ! pt) ! mt . (16)
This assumes that resource flows from pure net appreciation are realized at the
end of each year. Without this assumption, the formulae become very complex because
they must track each individual asset rather than total assets.
4.2.1.3 Summary of costs and benefits for treatments and controls
In financial BCA, benefits and costs for treatments and controls are resource
flows. Outflows are costs and include IDA deposits and taxes paid. Outflows do not
include resource conversions within the household nor cash spent on consumption.
Inflows are benefits and include withdrawals of IDAs deposits, of interest, and of
matches; earnings; and receipts of public assistance. Pure net appreciation is also a
benefit.
67 Pollack (1998).
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4.2.2 Non-participants
Non-participants are all people except treatments and IDA employees. The
standard assumption in financial BCA is that there is zero impact on non-participants.
This is the assumption adopted here. No data is collected on non-participants other
than controls.
Nonetheless, IDAs may in fact affect non-participants. The main point of the
discussion below is that the long-term effects of widespread access to IDAs for the
average person in a population may differ from the short-term effects for participants
because long-term, widespread access may change the overall context within which
individuals act. These general-equilibrium adjustments could, from the point of view of
society as a whole, attenuate the size of the impact of IDAs or even reverse its sign.67
Of course, the general-equilibrium adjustments might also accentuate the positive
effects on participants and have social effects whose benefits spill-over to non-
participants. The central point here is that, although the BCA analysis assumes that
non-participants are unaffected by IDAs, in fact there will be unknown effects on non-
participants in the long term.
In principle, IDA programs might affect non-participants in two ways. First,
non-participants pay taxes that support IDA programs. In the absence of IDAs, taxes
68 Figure 3 could also be interpreted as the market for skilled jobs, or as the
market for customers for goods and services from microenterprises.
69 Of course, if prices increase, then current homeowners are more likely to put
their homes on the market. In practice, however, the short-term supply of low-cost
homes (or of skilled jobs, or of customers for microenterprise) is not very price-sensitive
because people are not quick to abandon their homes (or their jobs, or their current
suppliers) in response to the chance to make a small increase in profits.
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might be cut, or public funds might be spent on something else that would benefit non-
participants (and perhaps even participants) more.
Second, IDAs subsidize the purchase of some types of assets. The subsequent
increase in the demand for these assets might increase the market prices faced by non-
participants. In particular, if only some of the poor use IDAs, then subsidies for them
(probably the least poor of the poor) may act as taxes on other poor people without
IDAs (probably the poorest of the poor). Of course, in the long term, higher prices will
attract greater supply and perhaps even induce innovation that reduces the cost of a
given supply (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).
As an example of how IDAs might affect market prices in equilibrium, suppose
that Figure 3 shows the supply and demand for low-cost houses.68 Price is on the
vertical axis, and quantity is on the horizontal axis. The demand curve slopes down
from left to right because lower prices prompt more people to buy low-cost homes. The
supply curve is vertical because, at least in the short-term, the number of homes in a
given place is fixed; even if prices skyrocket, it takes time to find land, design plans,
and construct.69
70 Non-participant homeowners would benefit from pure net appreciation.
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Without IDAs, supply and demand cross at price P* and quantity Q*. With
IDAs, more people have more resources earmarked for the purchase of low-cost homes,
so, at any given price, more people want to buy. Figure 3 shows this as a rightward
shift of the demand curve. The supply of low-cost homes, however, stays stuck at Q* in
the short term. To balance supply and demand, prices rise to P0. In this scenario,
access to IDAs does help IDA participants to buy low-cost homes and to improve their
long-term well-being, but it also pushes up the price of a low-cost home. This squeezes
some non-participants out of the market, and this decreases their long-term well-
being.70 Of course, if higher prices in the short term induce innovation that decreases
prices in the long term, then access to IDAs for IDA participants may actually increase
access to low-cost homes for non-participants in the long term.
In the long term, higher prices increase profits and attract greater supply. Figure
3 shows this as a rightward shift of the supply curve to either Q1 or Q2. IDAs will
indeed increase the long-term quantity of low-cost homes (or of skilled jobs, or of
customers of microenterprise) to some unknown extent. Exactly where the equilibrium
price settles is an empirical matter; it could be P1 > P* or P2 < P*. Thus, IDAs may
help or hurt poor non-participants.
71 Bates (1997) suggests that subsidized loan programs meant to foment
microenterprise in the inner city often merely displaced those firms that were not lucky
enough to get a loan or that were not dishonest enough to default.
72 Bendick and Egan (1987).
73 For example, pure net appreciation may sometimes only transfer resources
from people who want to buy assets to people who already own assets (Browne and
Gleason, 1996).
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IDAs for microenterprise may also harm non-participant entrepreneurs.71 If
markets for the goods and services of microenterprises have little slack, then subsidies
for some owners of small firms are taxes for other owners of small firms, at least in the
short term if not also in the long term. In fact, the standard assumption in government
evaluations of microenterprise programs in Great Britain is that 50 percent of net
benefits to participants come at the cost of displacement of non-participants.72
Likewise, the short-term supply of jobs that require post-secondary skills is
probably less than perfectly elastic. Thus, some participants who use IDAs to acquire
skills will displace some non-participants with the same skills.
Just as some benefits for participants are transfers from government and so have
no effect (otherwise than deadweight costs) on the well-being of society as a whole,
some benefits for participants may also be transfers from non-participants with no net
effect on social welfare.73 Unlike transfers to participants from government, however,
transfers to participants from non-participants are very difficult to measure because
74 Boshara, Scanlon, and Page-Adams (1998).
75 (Sherraden et al., 1995).
76 Sherraden et al. (1995).
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they depend on the unknown elasticities of supply and demand, on spillover effects
between markets, and on long-term general equilibrium.
The story told here is purposely simplified to make a simple point; IDAs have
long-term, general-equilibrium effects on the markets for the assets that they subsidize
and therefore cause benefits and costs not just for participants but also for non-
participants. The real world is more complex than has been suggested here; for
example, some participants may leapfrog the market for low-cost homes, or supply may
be more elastic than supposed here. Furthermore, IDAs may benefit participants
and/or non-participants in non-market ways. For example, home ownership has
positive effects on the neighborhood, not only on property values but also on the
behaviors of children.74 IDAs may also promote a culture of saving and ownership with
myriad positive, self-reinforcing effects for all citizens, as seems to have happened in
Singapore.75 Likewise, the economy as a whole may become more productive and
efficient because IDAs help microentrepreneurs to prospect new market niches and
because IDAs increase the supply of skilled workers. The community-level impact
analysis in ADD may give some insight into the qualitative nature and magnitude of
these benefits and costs.76
77 Evaluation expenses—such as the cost of the financial BCA—are omitted on
the assumption that a “normal” IDA program would not incur them.
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As stated above, the financial BCA of ADD makes the standard assumption
that IDAs have no effect on non-participants. Effects on non-participants, while real
and important, are simply too difficult to measure with any reasonable degree of
confidence.
4.2.3 Federal government
For the federal government, costs result from cash outflows for disbursements to
IDA programs, for the administration of these disbursements, and for public-assistance
programs. Benefits result from cash inflows from reimbursements from IDA programs
and from tax receipts. Tax breaks for private donors to IDA programs reduce cash
inflows from taxes and thus are negative benefits.
4.2.3.1 Costs to the federal government
4.2.3.1.1 Disbursements to IDA programs
The federal government incurs a cost when it disburses cash to IDA programs to
pay for IDA matches and for program administrative expenses (Table 3).77 MIS IDA
records the amount disbursed, and this is cross-checked with government records and
with program staff in the site visits.
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4.2.3.1.2 Administrative expenses
The federal government also bears costs for the payroll and administrative
overhead of the employees who oversee IDA disbursements. The analysis asks
government administrators to estimate the share of their time spent on IDA matters.
This share is then multiplied by the payroll and overhead expense for the
administrators as derived from agency budgets.
4.2.3.1.3 Public assistance
IDAs may increase self-sufficiency and thus decrease cash outflows for TANF,
Medicaid, food stamps, unemployment insurance, supplemental security income, public
housing, Section 8 subsidies, and other forms of means-tested public assistance. Such
reduced cash outflows are like benefits for the federal government because they are
negative costs. Changes in cash flows for public assistance from the point of view of the
federal government mirror the changes in cash flows for public assistance from the
point of view of participants, as already discussed above.
Benefits from decreased outflows accrue to federal, state, and local governments.
The share of cash savings allocated to each level is proportional to the share of a given
type of public assistance funded by that level. For example, if the federal government
pays for 100 percent of food stamps, then it is allocated 100 percent of any change in
outlays for food stamps.
78 The “Savings for Working Families Act of 2000” would give banks a 90-percent
tax credit (and non-banks a 50-percent credit) for grants to IDA programs, up to $100
million per bank per year (Boshara, 2000). This might pump billions into IDAs,
although the different credit rates for banks and non-banks seems odd. Because support
for IDA programs helps banks comply with the Community Reinvestment Act, the
proposed law might let banks substitute IDAs for some of their current non-IDA CRA
efforts and still meet the mandate. Furthermore, instead of banks bearing 100 percent
of the cost of their CRA efforts, taxpayers would foot 90 percent of the cost of IDA
program, and non-participants might benefit from less CRA activity. Thus, the
proposed law, although it would probably benefit poor people who get access to IDAs
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4.2.3.2 Benefits to the federal government
4.2.3.2.1 Reimbursements from IDA programs
The analysis assumes that, at the end of the time frame, the IDA program
reimburses all federal funds that are unspent and uncommitted to participant matches.
This is a benefit for the federal government (Table 3). Federal funds recorded in MIS
IDA are cross-checked with government records and with local IDA programs in the
site visits.
4.2.3.2.2 Tax receipts
Federal income taxes and FICA taxes are transfers from participants to the
federal government. Participants pay these taxes if they earn wages or if they own
small firms. Taxes received by the federal government are equal to taxes paid by
participants, as described above.
4.2.3.2.3 Tax breaks for private donors
Grants from taxable donors to not-for-profit IDA programs are tax-deductible
and may even qualify for tax credits.78 The consequent decrease in tax receipts is like a
because of the law, might not benefit society as a whole or even the poor in general.
61
cost for the federal government because it is a negative benefit. Grants to IDA
programs from not-for-profits do not affect tax receipts because not-for-profits are not
taxed anyway.
The analysis assumes that for-profit donors would not, in the absence of IDAs,
have made similar donations to other not-for-profit causes. The level of tax breaks is
computed from the I.R.S. code, data from MIS IDA, data from the site visit, and from
interviews with private donors.
4.2.4 State and local government
Benefits and costs for state and local government (Table 4) resemble those of the
federal government. The most important differences are that state and local
governments collect sales taxes but not FICA taxes and that state and local
governments do not contribute to some forms of means-tested public assistance.
4.2.4.1 Costs for state and local government
State and local governments incur costs for disbursements to IDA programs and
for administration. These are measured as they were for the federal government.
State and local governments also contribute to TANF, general assistance,
unemployment insurance, and other means-tested programs. These costs are computed
as they were for the federal government. Changes in flows due to IDAs are allotted
79 The analysis assumes that psychic benefits from altruism are part of the total
benefits that employees compare to their total costs.
80 Berger and Udell (1998), Schreiner (1997).
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among levels of government in proportion to how the programs were funded.
4.2.4.2 Benefits for state and local government
State or local governments benefit from cash in the IDA program at the end of
the time frame that is assumed to be reimbursed.
Furthermore, state and local government benefit from cash inflows from state
and local income taxes from wage workers and firms and from sales taxes from
households and firms. Income taxes are computed as the state or local tax rate
multiplied by adjusted gross income as computed in the estimation of federal taxes.
State and local taxes on net revenues from businesses are computed in the same way as
they were for federal taxes. Inflows for state and local government from sales taxes
mirror outflows computed for participants.
Finally, tax breaks reduce tax receipts from for-profit donors and thus are
negative benefits. These are computed as were tax breaks at the federal level.
4.2.5 Employees and administrators of local IDA programs
The people who run IDA programs require that their benefits exceed their
costs.79 If not, no one will run the programs, or employees will divert program resources
to perks or to a “quiet life”.80
81 In addition, some low-wage IDA employees are also IDA participants.
82 Even if wages and perks in the best alternative job were known, psychic
rewards would still be difficult to measure in units with inter-personal reliability.
83 If employees do not quit, then they probably believe that their benefits exceed
their costs (Schreiner, 1997).
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From the point of view of IDA employees, costs are the time and effort required
by work in the program. Benefits include wages, perks, and the psychic rewards of
helping the poor.81 Employees compare these net benefits to net benefits in their best
alternative job. The difference between the two choices is almost impossible to measure
without a control group of people who are qualified and willing to be IDA employees
but who are denied the chance to work as an employee in an IDA program through no
fault of their own.82
The financial BCA of ADD follows common practice and assumes that benefits
and costs for IDA employees are zero.83 The framework explicitly mentions employees
as a distinct group of stakeholders because an IDA program cannot be successful from
the point of view of society as a whole unless it is also successful from the point of view
of the employees who run the program.
4.2.6 Private donors
Private donors include foundations that give cash to IDA programs or that pay
for consulting services; not-for-profits that discount services; individuals who give cash
84 Schreiner and Yaron (1998).
85 If not, then the program might not merit evaluation (Moll, 1997).
64
or time; depository institutions that waive fees, boost interest rates, or modify systems
to accommodate IDAs; and not-for-profit organizations that host IDA programs.
4.2.6.1 Costs
Private donors bear costs from outflows in-cash and in-kind to an IDA program
(Table 5). In-kind transfers are equivalent to in-cash transfers because the donor could
have made a cash grant restricted to a specific purchase. As a general principle, the
measure of resource flows should be invariant to the arbitrary choice to transfer cash
versus goods or services.84
As a rule, the analysis values in-kind transfers at the market price for equivalent
goods or services. Donors estimate the likely market prices of their in-kind donations.
4.2.6.1.1 Disbursements to IDA programs
For private donors, cash disbursements to IDA programs are costs. They appear
in MIS IDA and are cross-checked in the site visits and in interviews with donors.
Documentation of cash disbursements should be excellent and simple to obtain.85
4.2.6.1.2 Administrative expenses of donors
Apart from donated resources, the act of donation itself requires resources for
the payroll and overhead of those who administer relationships with recipient IDA
86 An alternative is to ask the host how much it gives to the IDA program.
Indeed, the site visits do this as a crosscheck, but it is usually difficult to isolate the
cost of a single program within a multi-program organization (Rosenberg, Christen,
and Helms, 1997; Inter-American Development Bank, 1994). The residual technique
works because much—if not all—of the resource outflows from the host organization
are in-kind and because it is simpler to measure resource outflows from the point of
view of the IDA program than to measure resource outflows from the point of view of
the host organization.
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programs. The share of administrative expenses of private donors allocated to the IDA
program is computed as for government donors.
4.2.6.1.3 Grants from the host organization
Most IDA programs are not housed in single-purpose IDA organizations. Rather,
they are grafted into host organizations that do more than just IDAs. If the cash
expenses of the IDA program exceed cash donations earmarked for IDA administration,
then the host organization, perforce, makes up the difference from its own pocket.
Resources put into the IDA program by the host organization are resources not put
into other programs, so they are costs just like any other outflow from any other
private donor.
The analysis derives grants from the host—as in the case of pure net
appreciation for participants—as the residual in an accounting identity. Sources of
resources earmarked for administration—from the host and from other public or private
sponsors—must equal uses of resources in administration. Thus, grants from the host
are computed as the administrative expenses of the IDA program minus funds from
other sponsors earmarked for administration.86
87 Schreiner (2000b).
88 In-kind donations are free gifts. In contrast, IDA programs pay something
(but less than the market price) for discounted resources.
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IDA administrative expenses recorded in MIS IDA are cross-checked in a site
visit.87 Disbursements from other sponsors earmarked for administration are measured
in MIS IDA, the site visits, and interviews with donors.
4.2.6.1.4 Discounts on goods or services
Discounts are savings from lower-than-market prices. For example, a landlord
might rent office space to an IDA program for $600 per month when the going rate is
$1,000 per month. Discounts are like cash gifts; the landlord could transfer the same
resources if she replaced the discount with a cash gift of $400 and charged $1,000 rent.
Discounts are computed as the market price minus the discounted price. The
market price of resources not actually sold in the market is proxied by the price of
similar resources that are sold in the market. The site visits ask the IDA program and
donors about discounted transfers, prices paid by the IDA program, and normal market
prices.
4.2.6.1.5 In-kind donations
In-kind donations have a 100-percent discount.88 IDA programs often receive
large transfers in-kind, so accurate measurement deserves great care. Some in-kind
donations—whether adjustments by depository institutions, volunteer labor, or other
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types—may be recorded in MIS IDA, but they will in any case be cross-checked in site
visits and valued in interviews with donors at their likely market price.
4.2.6.1.5.1 Adjustments by depository institutions
Depository institutions that hold IDA accounts may adjust to accommodate
IDAs. For example, they may send monthly account statements not only to
participants but also to IDA administrators, write new software to send data
electronically to the IDA program, or adopt new protocols to protect match funds from
fraudulent withdrawal. Furthermore, they may waive minimum-deposit rules and
maintenance fees for IDAs or even boost the interest rate paid on IDA accounts.
These services are in-kind donations because, if they were not free, then the IDA
program would have to pay for them. The site visits enumerate adjustments made and
their costs to the depository institution. Most costs are from foregone fees and from the
time spent by employees on IDAs, valued as a share in total expenses for payroll and
overhead. Tax write-offs for IDA work claimed by depository institutions provide
excellent estimates of costs and of the implicit resource outflows from the IDA program.
4.2.6.1.5.2 Volunteers
IDA programs often use volunteer labor. Examples include full-time VISTAs,
part-time individuals, and unpaid teachers of financial-literacy courses. Volunteers
might also contact participants to encourage them, refer potential applicants to the
IDA program, provide free or discounted services to participants referred by IDA
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programs, advise participants on business plans or on tax returns, or provide
translation services.
Volunteer labor is worth the cash price of similar labor on the market. IDA
programs self-report hours of volunteer labor in MIS IDA. The site visits cross-check
this and ask administrators and volunteers about the amount of volunteer labor and
about its potential market worth.
4.2.6.1.5.3 Other in-kind donations
Other common in-kind donations include advertising space or air time, mailing
lists, airfare and lodging at conferences or meetings with donors, and consultancies.
MIS IDA does not record these, so the site visits check for their existence and
importance through a review of program and donor records.
4.2.6.2 Benefits
Private donors benefit from reimbursements of funds previously transferred to
IDA programs and from tax breaks linked to their donations (Table 5).
4.2.6.2.1 Reimbursements from IDA programs
Cash from a private donor unused by the IDA program is assumed to revert to
the donor at the end of the time frame. For the donor, the inflow is a benefit. If the
IDA program does not explicitly link the source and use of specific dollars, then
reimbursement is computed as the total amount of unused donated funds, pro-rated
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among public and private donors according to their original disbursements. Pro-rating
is not needed if donated funds are administratively linked to specific uses.
4.2.6.2.2 Tax breaks
 For-profit firms and individuals may claim tax write-offs for their donations.
The reduction in tax liability is like a cash transfer from government. When possible,
the specific tax write-off claimed—as reported in interviews with donors—is used in lieu
of the estimates described above in the discussion of the estimation of the costs of the
government.
4.2.7 Society as a whole
Financial benefits and costs for society as a whole are the aggregate of financial
benefits and costs for the other six groups of stakeholders. In Table 6, the rows list
types of flows, and the columns list groups of stakeholders. A minus sign (“!”) marks
costs for a given group, and a plus sign (“+”) marks benefits. Empty cells mean that a
given group is unaffected by a given resource flow. All effects for non-participants and
for IDA employees are assumed zero.
For each type of flow, the rightmost column is the net benefit for society as a
whole. This is the sum across columns for the other six groups of stakeholders. For
example, IDA deposits are outflows (costs) for participants followed later by inflows
(benefits). The sum for society is negative because the outflows take place first and so
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are discounted less. For society, net flows from taxes, public assistance, and tax breaks
are zero because they are simultaneous transfers among the other six groups.
The last row of Table 6 sums the column effects. Each stakeholder has benefits
and costs, so the sign of the net effect is unknown, shown with a question mark (“?”).
The bottom-right cell is the net effect for society as a whole. This is computed
either as the sum across columns of the net effects for the other six groups of
stakeholders or as the sum across rows of the net effects for each type of flow. Whether
social benefits exceed social costs is unknown.
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Appendix 1: Average Financial Cost Analysis
IDAs are a single intervention with multiple effects.89 Although many of these
effects are quantitative, some quantitative effects are difficult to value in units of
dollars and so cannot enter the financial BCA. The overall cost-effectiveness analysis,
however, should consider them.
Average financial cost analysis is one tool to do this. It compares a quantitative
change (for example, in the probability of voting) with net benefits from the financial
BCA. Given a point of view, the average financial cost of a unit of impact is defined as
the quantitative change divided by the net financial benefit.
For example, suppose that net financial benefits to participants per year of
participation are !$50. Then suppose that a year of participation, in addition to the
financial effects, increases the probability of voting by 5 percentage points and also
increases the probability of expecting a child to attend college by 4 percentage points.
Then the average financial cost of a 1-percentage-point increase in the probability of
voting is 5 / $100 = $20. Likewise, the average financial cost of a 1-percentage-point
increase in the probability of expecting a child to attend college is 4 / $100 = $25.
Average financial costs are not additive across effects. For example, a year of
participation and $100 in financial costs provide both a 5-percentage-point increase in
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the likelihood of voting and a 4-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of expecting
a child to attend college. In this sense, average financial costs are overstated; some of
the $20 cost of a 1-percentage-point increase in voting is really part of the cost of the
concurrent 1-percentage point increase in the expectation that a child will attend
college. Average financial costs understate average total costs, however, because some
costs are not financial and are thus ignored.
Average financial cost analysis is useful because it compares quantitative, non-
cash effects to net financial benefits. In the example above, the overall judgement of the
worthwhileness of IDAs would hinge not on the net financial loss of $50 alone but
rather also on whether the increases in voting and in hope for children are great enough
to compensate for the net financial loss.
The survey captures the effects of IDAs on the following types of quantitative,
non-financial outcomes. The effects are measured as the differences in outcomes
between treatments and controls.
Human capital
! Education
! Grades completed
! Degrees and certificates earned
! Participation in job-training
! Health
! Health status
! Coverage by private health insurance
! Mental health
! Satisfaction with life in general
! Respect from others
! Feelings of self-esteem and self-efficacy
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Employment
! Wage-employment status
! Hours worked
! Earnings per hour
! Self-employment status
! Hours worked
! Earnings per hour
! Small-business start-up rate
! Plans to start a small business
Physical capital
! Housing
! Homes purchased
! Home-ownership rate
! Home maintenance and repair completed
! Time spent in search of a house
! Ownership rate of rental property or land
! Ownership rate of durable household goods
! Vehicle
! Refrigerator
! Stove
! Computer
! Clothes washer
! Clothes dryer
! Window air conditioner
! Freezer
! Dishwasher
! Sewing machine
Financial capital
! Bank-account ownership
! Balance in savings or checking accounts
! Savings earmarked for education
! Savings accounts held by children
! Satisfaction with financial capabilities
! Use of check-cashing outlets
! Savings habits
! Propensity to save from a windfall
! Use of budgets
! Use of rules, goals, or plans for financial savings
! Stock ownership
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! Debts owed
! Business assets
! Business net worth
! Household assets (net of business net worth)
! Household net worth (net of business net worth)
Social capital
! Family
! Marital status
! Divorce rate
! Household composition
! Quality of family relationships
! Maturity in the resolution of household disputes
! Community
! Parental involvement in school
! Involvement in the neighborhood
! Use of formal and informal support networks
! Types of retail, grocery, and furniture stores used
Hope
! Expectations for the future education of children
! Expectations for the future financial situation of children
! Frequency of the discussion of the future with children
The overall cost-effectiveness analysis consider net financial benefits (a single
number), quantitative non-cash effects and their average financial costs (a list of
numbers), and qualitative benefits and costs and an explicit estimation of their likely
importance (a verbal discussion). Whether benefits exceed costs overall is a judgement
call, and the best that the analysis can do is to make the judgement carefully and
explicitly so that improvements easier to make.
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Table 1: Financial costs for treatments, controls
Cash outflow Source of data
IDA deposits MIS IDA, survey
Taxes paid
Federal
Income
Job Survey, I.R.S. code
Business Survey, I.R.S. code
FICA
Job Survey, FICA law
Business Survey, FICA law
State and local
Income
Job Survey, state and local tax law
Business Survey, state and local tax law
Property and sales
Job Survey, state and local tax law
Business Survey, state and local tax law
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Table 2: Financial benefits for treatments, controls
Cash inflow Source of data
Withdrawals of IDA savings
Deposits
Approved MIS IDA, survey
Unapproved MIS IDA, survey
Interest earned
Approved MIS IDA, survey
Unapproved MIS IDA, survey
Withdrawals of IDA matches MIS IDA, survey
Earnings
Wage employment Survey
Self-employment Survey
Other earnings Survey
Public assistance
TANF Survey
Supplemental security income Survey
General assistance Survey
Medicaid Survey, cost per user of Medicaid
Food stamps Survey
Unemployment insurance Survey
Public housing Survey
Section-8 subsidies Survey
Other (e.g., utility assistance) Survey
Appreciation of assets
Home Survey
Business Survey
Property or land Survey
Stocks Survey
84
Table 3: Financial costs and benefits for the
federal government
Cash outflows (costs) Source of data
Disbursements to IDA programs MIS IDA, govt. budgets, site visit
Administrative expenses Govt. budgets, administrative estimates
Public assistance
TANF Survey
Supplemental security income Survey
General assistance Survey
Medicaid Survey, cost per user of Medicaid
Food stamps Survey
Unemployment insurance Survey
Public housing Survey
Section-8 subsidies Survey
Other (e.g., utility assistance) Survey
Cash inflows (benefits) Source of data
Reimbursements from IDA programs MIS IDA, govt. budgets, site visit
Tax receipts
Income
Job Survey, I.R.S. code
Business Survey, I.R.S. code
FICA
Job Survey, FICA law
Business Survey, FICA law
Tax breaks for private donors Site visit, MIS IDA, I.R.S. code,
interview with private donor
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Table 4: Financial costs and benefits for state and
local governments
Cash outflows (costs) Source of data
Disbursements to IDA programs MIS IDA, govt. budgets, site visit
Administrative expenses Govt. budgets, administrative estimates
Public assistance
TANF Survey
General assistance Survey
Unemployment insurance Survey
Other (e.g., utility assistance) Survey
Cash inflows (benefits) Source of data
Reimbursements from IDA programs MIS IDA, govt. budgets, site visit
Tax receipts
Income
Job Survey, state and local law
Business Survey, state and local law
Sales
Job Survey, state and local law
Business Survey, state and local law
Tax breaks for private donors Site visit, MIS IDA, state and local law,
interview with private donor
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Table 5: Financial costs and benefits for private
donors
Cash outflows (costs) Source of data
Disbursements to IDA programs MIS IDA, donor records, site visits
Administrative expenses Donor records, interviews
Cash donations from parent organization MIS IDA, program and donor records,
site visit
Discounts on goods and services Program and donor records, interviews
In-kind donations
Adjustments to systems or accounts Donor records, interviews
Volunteer time Program and donor records, interviews
Other in-kind donations Program and donor records
Cash inflows (benefits) Source of data
Reimbursements from IDA programs MIS IDA, donor records, site visits
Tax breaks Donor and program records, interviews,
federal, state, and local tax law
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Table 6: Expected financial benefits and costs for six groups of
stakeholders and for society as a whole
Flow Participants
Non-
participants
Federal
govt.
State and
local govt.
IDA
employees
Private
donors
Society as
a whole
IDA deposits  !, +  !
IDA interest  +  +
IDA matches  +  +
Taxes  !  +  +
Public assistance  !  +  +
Earnings  +  +
Pure net appreciation  +  +
Tax breaks  !  !  +
Disbursements  !  !  !  !
Reimbursements  +  +  +  +
Admin. expenses  !  !  !  !
Discounts  !  !
In-kind donations  !  !
Column sum  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
88
Figure 1: Financial BCA in the Context of the
Overall Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation
Overall cost-effectiveness evaluation
Qualitative/subjective
benefits and costs
Quantitative/objective
benefits and costs
Non-dollar units
Average-cost analysis
Dollar units
Financial BCAAve.  Financial
Cost Analysis
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Figure 2: Example assumptions about extrapolation past time T
Extrapolation of changes
Change in net
cash flows ($)
0.5
Time (years)
3.5=T1.5 5.52.5 4.5
4
3
1
2
0
1
2
3
No extrapolation
Extrapolation of levels
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Figure 3: Possible General-Equilibrium Effects of IDAs on Market for
Low-Cost Homes, Educated Labor, or Microenterprise
Demand
(without IDAs)
Demand
(with IDAs)
P*
Supply (short-term) Supply (long-term 2)Supply (long-term 1)Price
Q*
P0
P2
P1
Q1 Q2   Quantity
